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THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION AS A BILL 
OF RIGHTS 
Leonard W. Levy* 
The exclusion of a bill of rights was fundamental to the consti-
tutional theory of the Framers of the Constitution. For that reason 
they deliberately omitted such a bill. Yet, no Framer opposed the 
rights conventionally protected by a bill of rights. As George 
Washington wrote to LaFayette during the controversy over ratifi-
cation, "there was not a member of the Convention, I believe, who 
had the least objection to what is contended by the advocates for a 
Bill of Rights."I All the Framers were civil libertarians. Why then 
did they deliberately exclude an enumeration of the rights of the 
people, and why did they not prohibit the national government 
from abridging those rights? They believed that a bill of rights was 
quite unnecessary, because the Constitution, as they framed it, ade-
quately protected the people's rights. 
Thomas McKean, second only to James Wilson as an advocate 
of the ratification of the Constitution in Pennsylvania, explained to 
his state's ratifying convention that a bill of rights "is an unneces-
sary instrument, for, in fact, the whole plan of government is noth-
ing more than a bill of rights-a declaration of the people in what 
manner they choose to be governed. "2 Alexander Hamilton made 
the point even more directly in Federalist No. 84 when writing that 
"the Constitution is itself in every rational sense, and to every useful 
purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS." Indeed, he added, the proposed 
Constitution "will be a bill of rights of the union. "J But why was a 
bill of rights unnecessary, and why was the Constitution itself in 
effect such a bill, in the minds of the Framers? 
Hamilton's explanation reflected the Federalist party line. 
Bills of rights, he declared, originated as contracts between a king 
• Editor, Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. 
I. Washington to Lafayette, April 28, 1788, quoted in Charles Warren, The Making of 
the Constitution 508 n.2 (Little Brown, 1928). 
2. Merrill Jensen, ed., The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, 
Volume 2: Ratification of the Constitution by the States. Pennsylvania 387 (State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin, 1976) ("Documentary History"). 
3. Federalist 84 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 581 (Wesleyan U. 
Press, 1961). 
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and his subjects, as in the case of Magna Carta, the Petition of 
Right, or the Declaration of Rights. Accordingly, bills of rights 
had no relevance to constitutions founded on the power of the peo-
ple, who retained all rights and surrendered none. The preamble of 
the Constitution constituted "a better recognition of popular rights 
than volumes of those aphorisms" contained in the state bills of 
rights; those aphorisms "would sound much better in a treatise of 
ethics than in a constitution of government. "4 
Moreover, observed Hamilton, a bill of rights was not only un-
necessary but would be "dangerous," because it 
would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and on 
this very account, would afford a colourable pretext to claim 
more (powers) than were granted. For why declare that things 
shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for in-
stance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be 
restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be 
imposed?S 
Similarly, James Wilson, the most influential Framer next to 
James Madison, sought to explain the Convention's omission of a 
bill of rights by observing that while the people of the states vested 
in their governments all powers and rights not explicitly reserved, 
the case was different as to the national government, whose author-
ity rested on enumerated powers. Therefore everything not dele-
gated to the United States was reserved to the people or the states. 
A bill of rights stipulated the reserved rights of the people; the Con-
stitution, however, merely provided for the existence of an effective 
national government. An enumeration of popular rights not 
divested would, therefore, be "absurd. "6 
Wilson trumpeted the Federalist line when he made the argu-
ment that a bill of rights would be "preposterous and dangerous," 
would put rights at risk, and would augment national powers. He 
reasoned that a formal declaration on freedom of the press or of 
religion, over which Congress had no powers whatever, could "im-
ply" that some degree of power over the press or religion had been 
granted because of an attempt to define its extent. Wilson also in-
sisted on the impossibility of enumerating and reserving all the 
rights of the people. A bill of rights, he added, "is an enumeration 
of the powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, everything 
that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The consequence 
is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied powers 
4. Id. at 579. 
5. ld. 
6. Jensen. 2 Documentary History at 390 (cited in note 2). 
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into the scale of the government; and the rights of the people would 
be rendered incomplete."? (That argument eventually gave rise to 
the ninth amendment.) 
The rights of the people, according to Federalist theoreticians, 
depended not on "parchment provisions," but on public opinion, an 
extended republic, a federal system, a pluralistic society of compet-
ing interests, and a national government of limited powers struc-
tured to prevent any interest from becoming an overbearing 
majority and to prevent any branch of government from exercising 
a power that could jeopardize liberty. 
Personal liberty depended on public opinion rather than parch-
ment guarantees because experience had revealed such guarantees 
to be ineffective when confronted by "public necessity." The Fram-
ers tended to be skeptical about the value of a bill of rights when 
confronted by what James Madison called "overbearing majori-
ties." He had seen repeated violations of the bills of rights in every 
state. Recent history had revealed the futility of a bill of rights 
"when its controul is most needed."s In Virginia, for example, the 
constitutional protection of the rights of conscience meant little 
when the legislature had favored an establishment of religion; it was 
averted only because Madison and dissenters turned the tide of 
opinion against the bill. Any Framer could have cited examples of 
abridgements of civil liberties during times of popular hysteria. 
Moreover, no state bill of rights was sufficiently comprehen-
sive, and six states did not even have bills of rights. Virginia's 
highly praised Declaration of Rights omitted as many rights as it 
protected. It failed to protect against bills of attainder, for example, 
and the legislature had enacted them. A majority of states failed to 
protect basic rights; seven omitted a prohibition on ex post facto 
laws, nine failed to provide for grand jury proceedings, ten said 
nothing about freedom of speech, and eleven were silent about ex-
posure to double jeopardy. Whether or not omissions implied a 
power to violate, omissions seemed to the Framers to raise a danger 
that could be prevented by avoiding the problem altogether: omit a 
bill of rights when forming a new national government of limited 
powers. 
The fact that the government possessed only limited powers 
secured liberty. The fact that it was a government that was neither 
wholly national nor wholly federal also secured liberty, as The Fed-
eralist argued. The fact that the powers of government were di-
7. ld. at 388. 
8. Madison to Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, Robert Rutland, et. al., eds., II The Papers of 
James Jfadison 297 (U. Press of Virginia, 1979). 
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vided between the United States and the states contributed to the 
same end. The fact that the powers of the government of the 
United States were separated among three branches that were capa-
ble of checking each other also made it more difficult for the gov-
ernment to repress individuals or minorities. The entire system of 
checks and balances (the Senate's confirmation of treaties and ap-
pointments, the bicameral system, the staggered terms of office, the 
periodic elections, the executive veto, the congressional controls 
over the judicial branch, the possibility of judicial review) worked 
against a tyranny of the majority. The fact that Congressmen repre-
sented large districts with diverse interests also militated against 
factional triumphs over the people. America's great diversity was 
the very greatest safeguard ofliberty, an insurance that one class, or 
religion, or section, or interest, or faction could not become too 
powerful, jeopardizing the liberty of others. Diversity constituted a 
natural system of checks and balances, making for an equilibrium of 
powers contributing to the same end. 
The argument that the Constitution adequately secured liberty 
and made a bill of rights superfluous, even dangerous, seductively 
attracted the proponents of ratification. But some of the points that 
they made were patently absurd, such as the claim that bills of 
rights were appropriate in England but not in America. In fact 
eleven states had framed written constitutions during the Revolu-
tion, and seven drew up bills of rights; even the four without such 
bills inserted in their constitutions some provisions normally found 
in bills of rights, as had the Framers when drafting the Constitution 
for the Union. To imply that bills of rights were un-American or 
unnecessary merely because the people in America were the source 
of all power was unhistorical. 
Americans had become accustomed over a period of a century 
and a half to the idea that people created government by written 
compacts or constitutions that were fundamental law; that the gov-
ernment must be subject to such limitations that were necessary for 
the security of the rights of the people; and usually that the reserved 
rights of the people were enumerated in bills of rights. Yet, James 
Wilson had repeatedly informed the Pennsylvania ratifying conven-
tion that a bill of rights was unnecessary in America, even though 
Pennsylvania's state constitution had an elaborate Declaration of 
Rights. Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia, another influen-
tial Framer, declared at the Virginia ratifying convention that the 
esteemed Virginia Declaration of Rights "has never secured us 
against danger; it has been repeatedly disregarded and violated." 
That was merely exaggeration, but Randolph's rhetoric risked dis-
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belief when he declared, "Our situation is radically different from 
that of the people of England. What have we to do with bills of 
rights? ... A bill of rights, therefore, accurately speaking, is quite 
useless, if not dangerous to a republic. "9 
That supporters of the Constitution could ask, "What have we 
to do with a bill of rights" suggests that they had made a colossal 
error of judgment. They had omitted a bill of rights and then com-
pounded their error by refusing to admit it. Their single-minded 
purpose of creating an effective government had exhausted their en-
ergies and good sense, and when they found themselves on the de-
fensive, under an accusation that their handiwork threatened the 
liberties of the people, their frayed nerves led them into indefensible 
positions. Any opponent of ratification could have answered Ran-
dolph's question, or Wilson's speeches, or Hamilton's Federalist No. 
84, and many capably did so. 
If a bill of rights was unnecessary, they asked, why did the 
Constitution protect some rights? The protection of some rights 
opened the Framers and their supporters to devastating rebuttal. 
They claimed that because no bill of rights could be complete, the 
omission of a particular right might imply a power to abridge it as 
unworthy of respect by the government. That argument, in effect 
that to include some rights would exclude all others, boomeranged. 
Hamilton, in Federalist No. 84, oblivious of inconsistency and 
illogic, had elaborately described the protections of particular rights 
in the proposed Constitution. Impeachments were regulated by 
guarantees of indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment accord-
ing to law. No religious test could be exacted from office holders. 
Ex post facto laws and bills of attainder were banned, as were titles 
of nobility. Treason was narrowly defined; its proof regulated. In 
criminal cases trial by jury was guaranteed, and the writ of habeas 
corpus was protected too. 
In Pennsylvania, Robert Whitehall answered James Wilson by 
noting the Constitution's protection of selected rights, and he called 
on Wilson to reconcile his argument with the Convention's handi-
work. "For," declared Whitehall, "if there was danger in the at-
tempt to enumerate the liberties of the people, lest it should prove 
imperfect and defective, how happens it, that in the instances I have 
mentioned, that danger has been incurred? Have the people no 
other rights worth their attention, or is it to be inferred, agreeably 
to the maxim of our opponents, that every other right is aban-
doned?" Stipulating a right, he believed, destroyed the "argument 
9_ Jonathan Elliot, ed., 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions On the Adoption 
of the Federal Constitution 191 (Lippincott, 2d ed. 1891) ("Debates"). 
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of danger."lo Surely the Philadelphia Convention might have 
thought of some rights in addition to those protected in the Consti-
tution. The ban on religious tests could have reminded them of 
freedom of religion. Did not its omission, together with the reason-
ing of proponents of ratification, necessarily mean that the govern-
ment could attack freedom of religion? 
What prevented enumerated powers from being abused by the 
new government, at the expense of personal liberties? Congress's 
power to tax, for example, might be aimed at the press or at reli-
gion, and therefore was a power to destroy or restrain their free-
doms. Taxes might even be exacted for the support of a religious 
denomination. Tax collectors, unrestrained by a ban on general 
warrants, might invade homes and, as Patrick Henry feared, might 
search and ransack everything. Congress, he warned, might "extort 
confession by torture" in order to convict a violator of federal law .11 
Numerous opponents of ratification contended that Congress could 
define as crimes the violation of any laws that it might legitimately 
enact, and in the absence of a bill of rights, accused persons might 
be deprived of the rights to counsel, to indictment, to cross-examine 
witnesses, to produce evidence on their own behalf, to be free from 
compulsory self-incrimination, to be protected against double jeop-
ardy and excessive bail, and to be exempt from excessive fines and 
cruel punishments. 
Henry cleverly observed that the "fair implication" of the ar-
gument against a bill of rights was that the government could do 
anything not forbidden by the Constitution. Because the provision 
on the writ of habeas corpus allowed its suspension whenever the 
public safety required, Henry reasoned, "It results clearly that, if it 
had not said so, they could suspend it in all cases whatsoever. It 
reverses the position of the friends of this Constitution, that every 
thing is retained which is not given up; for, instead of this, every 
thing is given up which is not expressly reserved."l2 
Richard Henry Lee, also advocating a bill of rights, similarly 
scorned the ratificationists' arguments, turning them upside down. 
For example, he observed that a clause of the Constitution prohib-
ited Congress from granting titles of nobility. If the clause had been 
omitted, would Congress have the power to grant such titles and 
create an aristocracy? "Why then," he asked, "by a negative clause, 
restrain congress from doing what it would have no power to do? 
This clause, then, must have no meaning, or imply, that were it 
10. Jensen, 2 Documentary History at 427 (cited in note 2). 
II. Elliot, 3 Debates at 448 (cited in note 9). 
12. ld. at 461. 
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omitted, congress would have the power in question ... on the prin-
ciple that congress possess the powers not expressly reserved." Lee 
objected to leaving the rights of the people to "logical inferences," 
because the Framers' principles led to the implication that all the 
rights not mentioned in the Constitution were intended to be 
relinquished. 13 
Abroad, two wise Americans serving their country on diplo-
matic missions appraised the proposed Constitution without the ob-
ligation of having to support a party line. John Adams in London, 
having received a copy of the document, wrote to Thomas Jefferson, 
in Paris, to say that he thought the Constitution was admirably cal-
culated to preserve the Union, and he hoped that it would be rati-
fied with amendments. "What think you of a Declaration of 
Rights?" he asked. "Should not such a Thing have preceeded the 
Model?"I4 Jefferson agreed. In his first letter commenting on the 
proposed Constitution, he wrote Madison that he liked the Consti-
tution but concluded by saying what he did not like about it: "First 
the omission of a bill of rights." After listing the rights he thought 
deserved special protection, starting with the freedoms of religion 
and of the press, Jefferson dismissed as campaign rhetoric Wilson's 
justification for the omission of a bill of rights, and Jefferson con-
cluded: "Let me add that a bill of rights is what the people are 
entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, 
and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference."I5 
Madison, who had long opposed a bill of rights, finally 
changed his mind-mainly for political reasons, but also because he 
came to understand that a bill or rights would complete the Consti-
tution. When, in the First Congress, he introduced the amend-
ments that became the Bill of Rights, he explained that all power is 
subject to abuse, which should be guarded against by securing "the 
great rights of mankind." The government possessed only limited 
powers but it might misuse them. He sought to limit the powers of 
all branches of the government, unlike liberty documents in Great 
Britain which operated only against the executive and left the legis-
lative branch unrestrained. The great objective was to prevent 
abuses of power by "the body of the people, operating by the major-
ity against the minority." He still believed that "paper barriers" 
might fail, but they raised a standard that might educate the major-
13. Letters/rom the Federal Farmer, Herbert J. Storing, ed., 2 The Complete Anti-Fed-
eralist 326 (U. of Chi. Press, 1981). Lee's authorship is highly probable but not positive. 
14. Adams to Jefferson, Nov. 10, 1787, Lester Cappon, ed., I The Adams-Jefferson Let-
ters 210 (U. North Carolina Press, 1959). 
15. Jefferson to Madison, Dec. 20, 1787, Julian P. Boyd, et. al., eds., 12 The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson 440 (Princeton U. Press, 1950). 
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ity against acts to which they might be inclined.l6 Moreover, he 
declared, if his amendments were adopted, 
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a pe-
culiar manner the guardians of these rights; they will be an im-
penetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the 
legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every 
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the consti-
tution by the declaration of rights.l7 
Off the record, in his private correspondence, Madison re-
vealed other motives for his unyielding demand for amendments 
protecting personal liberties. He knew that the amendments, if 
adopted, would kill the movement for a second convention, sought 
by opponents of the Constitution for the purpose of crippling the 
powers of the national government. He believed that the adoption 
of his amendments would appease the fears of the common people 
and give them confidence in the new government. He meant, also, 
to isolate the opponents of the Constitution from their followers; 
the adoption of his amendments, he said, "will kill the opposition 
every where," and put an end to disaffection to the new govern-
ment's Madison's political judgment was right. The Bill of Rights 
fulfilled the Constitution as a matter of political theory, and it also 
had the healing effect that he predicted. The Framers had rectified 
their great blunder of omission. 
16. Madison's speech of June 8, 1789 is reprinted in Bernard Schwartz, ed., 2 The Bill 
of Rights: A Documentary History 1023-34 (Chelsea House, 1971). 
17. Id. at 1031. 
18. Madison to Richard Peters, Aug. 19, 1789, Rutland, 12 The Papers of James 
Madison at 347 (cited in note 8). 
